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Abstract—MANET routing protocols are designed based on
the assumption that all nodes cooperate without maliciously
disrupting the operation of the routing protocol. AODV is a
reactive MANET routing protocol that is vulnerable to a dramatic
collapse of network performance in the presence of blackhole
attack. The paper introduces a new concept of Self-Protocol
Trustiness (SPT) in which detecting a malicious intruder is ac-
complished by complying with the normal protocol behavior and
lures the malicious node to give an implicit avowal of its malicious
behavior. We present a Blackhole Resisting Mechanism (BRM)
to resist such attacks that can be incorporated into any reactive
routing protocol. It does not require expensive cryptography or
authentication mechanisms, but relies on locally applied timers
and thresholds to classify nodes as malicious. No modifications to
the packet formats are needed, so the overhead is a small amount
of calculation at nodes, and no extra communication. Using
NS2 simulation, we compare the performance of networks using
AODV under blackhole attacks with and without our mechanism
to SAODV, showing that it significantly reduces the effect of a
blackhole attack.
Keywords—MANET, Routing, AODV, Security, Attack, Black-
hole, Self-Protocol Trustiness
I. INTRODUCTION
A Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is a decentralized
infrastructureless network in which nodes cooperate to forward
data from a source to a destination. Each node in a MANET
acts both as a router and as a host. Several routing protocols
have been designed for MANETs [3] to optimize network
routing performance. The major issues involved in designing
a routing protocol for MANET are node mobility, bandwidth
constrained and error prone wireless channel, resource con-
strained nodes, and dynamic changing of the network topology
[1].
MANET routing protocols can be classified as proactive or
reactive routing protocols. In proactive (table-driven) routing
protocols, each node maintains one or more tables containing
routing information to every other node in the network. While
in reactive (on-demand) routing protocols, routes are created
whenever a source requires to send data to a destination node
which means that these protocols are initiated by a source
on-demand. In this paper, we focus on the AODV protocol
[12] which is one of the extensively studied reactive protocols,
considered by the IETF for standardization.
Conventional MANET routing protocols assume that all
nodes cooperate without maliciously disrupting the operation
of the protocol and do not provide defense against malicious
attackers. However, the existence of malicious nodes cannot be
ignored in computer networks, especially in MANETs because
of the wireless nature of the network. MANET inherits security
threats that are faced in wired as well as wireless networks
and also introduces security attacks unique to itself [6] due its
characteristics. Nodes in MANET have limited computation
and power capabilities that make the network more vulnerable
to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. It is difficult to implement
cryptography and key management algorithms which need
substantial computations like public key algorithms. Node
mobility introduces also a difficulty of distinguishing between
stale routes and fake routes. A malicious node can attack the
network layer in MANET either by not forwarding packets
or by changing some parameters of routing messages such
as sequence number and IP addresses, sending fake messages
several times and sending fake routing information to disrupt
routing operations. A large number of attacks on MANET
[15] are known and many solutions have been proposed to
resist them. Simulation studies have shown the impact of such
attacks and the effectiveness of proposed defence mechanisms
[11] [17].
Security mechanisms can be added to existing routing
protocols to resist attacks. Cryptographic techniques are used
to ensure the authenticity and integrity of routing messages
[5]. A major concern is the trade off between security and
performance, given the limited resources available at many
MANET nodes. Both symmetric and asymmetric cryptography
have been used as well as hash chaining. Examples of these
security enhanced protocols are Authenticated Routing for
Ad-hoc Networks (ARAN) [13], Secure Link State Routing
Protocol (SLSP) [10], and Secure Ad-hoc On-demand Distance
Vector routing (SAODV) [18]. In addition to the power and
computation cost of using cryptographic techniques, the perfor-
mance of secured mechanism is worse than non-secured in the
presence of some attacks [2]. Securing the routing messages
does not guarantee the detection of these malicious nodes.
We introduce a new Blackhole Resisting Mechanism
(BRM) that can be used for all on-demand routing protocols.
Each node in this mechanism is responsible for monitoring
the behaviour of its neighbors to detect malicious nodes and
exclude them. We incorporate our proposed mechanism into
AODV as an example of its use with on-demand routing
protocols. This paper demonstrates a significant improvement
in performance when using our mechanism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
AODV and its behavior under blackhole attack is presented.
Section III presents the related work. In Section IV, our
proposed mechanism to detect the blackhole attack is intro-
duced. In Section V, the simulation approach and parameters
is presented. In Section VI, simulation results are given. In
Section VII, conclusions are drawn.
II. AODV UNDER BLACKHOLE ATTACK
AODV [12] is a reactive routing protocol. It uses destina-
tion sequence numbers to ensure the freshness of routes and
guarantee loop freedom. To find a path to a destination, a node
broadcasts a route request (RREQ) packet to its neighbors
using a new sequence number. Each node that receives the
broadcast sets up a reverse route towards the originator of
the RREQ unless it has a fresher one. When the intended
destination or an intermediate node that has a fresh route to the
destination receives the RREQ, it unicasts a reply by sending
a route reply (RREP) packet along the reverse path established
at intermediate nodes during the route discovery process. Then
the source node starts sending data packets to the destination
node through the neighboring node that first responded with
an RREP. When an intermediate node along the route moves,
its upstream neighbor will notice route breakage due to the
movement and propagate a route error (RERR) packet to
each of its active upstream neighbors. Routing information is
stored only in the source node, the destination node, and the
intermediate nodes along the active route which deal with data
transmission. This scenario decreases the memory overhead,
minimizes the use of network resources, and runs well in high
mobility situations.
In a blackhole attack [14], a malicious node absorbs the
network traffic and drops all packets. Once a malicious node
receives a RREQ packet from any other node, it immediately
sends a false RREP; without checking its routing table; with
a high sequence number and hop count equals 2 (i.e. one hop
from the source and the destination) to spoof its neighbours
that it has the best route to the destination. The malicious node
reply will be received by the source node before any other
replies. The high sequence number will cause the route includ-
ing the malicious node to be selected. When the data packets
routed by the source node reach the blackhole node, it drops
the packets rather than forwarding them to the destination
node. A malicious node initiating a blackhole attack generates
a fake RREP for each RREQ it receives to incorporate itself in
a route, therefore all packets are sent to a point where they are
not forwarded anywhere which is a form of a denial of service
(DoS) attack. A node has no way of detecting whether the
neighbor that sent the RREP is malicious or not. A blackhole
attack has a dramatic impact on the network performance [2].
III. RELATED WORK
Since the on-demand routing protocols have been in-
troduced, many significant algorithms have been proposed
to secure MANET against blackhole attack. Some of these
solutions use various cryptographic techniques to secure the
routing packets. While these solutions introduce high immunity
to the blackhole attack, network nodes suffer from the high
computations required which does not suit the characteristics
of MANET. Other solutions suggest modification to the routing
protocols by adding some packets, modifying the existing
packets or changing the procedure of these protocols.
Such solutions focus their suggested mechanisms on two
characteristics of the RREP received from a blackhole node;
the first is that this reply is usually received before any other
replies as a result of blackhole node not needing to check
its route table. The second is that this fake RREP usually
contains a much higher sequence number relative to the RREQ
because the blackhole node tries to convince its neighbours it
has a fresh route to destination node. All these solutions make
assumptions about blackhole behavior and cannot guarantee
that excluded nodes are genuine blackholes. In this section we
introduce some of the existing algorithms used to avoid the
blackhole attack.
SAODV [18] is an enhancement of AODV routing protocol
to fulfil security feature. The protocol operates mainly by
appending an extension message to each AODV message. The
extension messages include a digital signature of the AODV
packet using the private key of the original sender of the
routing message and a hash value of the hop count. SAODV
uses asymmetric cryptography to authenticate all non-mutable
fields of routing messages as well as hash chain to authenticate
the hop count (the only mutable) field. Since all fields except
the hop count of routing messages are non-mutable they can
be authenticated by verifying the signature using the public
key of the message originator. So, when a routing message
is received by a node, the node verifies the signature of the
received packet. If the signature is verified, the node computes
the hash value of the hop count; if the routing message is
RREQ or RREP; and compares it with the corresponding value
in the SAODV extension. If they match, the routing message
is valid and will be forwarded with an incremented hop count
and a new hash value or if the destination has been reached
generate the RREP.
S. Lee [7] proposed a solution that modified the AODV
routing protocol by introducing two new packets; the route
confirmation request (CREQ) and route confirmation reply
(CREP). An intermediate node has to send CREQ to its next-
hop node toward the destination node in addition to RREP
to the source node. Upon receiving a CREQ, the next-hop
node looks up its cache for a route to the destination. If it
has a route, it sends the CREP to the source. After receiving
the CREP, the source node can confirm the validity of the
path by comparing the path in RREP and the one in CREP.
If both are coordinated, the source node judges that the route
is appropriate. One drawback of this method is that it cannot
avoid the cooperative blackhole attack if two consecutive nodes
work together as the first node asked its next hop node to send
CREP to the source.
L. Tamilselvan [16] proposed a solution that designed upon
a Fidelity Table in which each participating node is assigned
with a fidelity level that determines the node reliability. A
default fidelity level is assigned to each node and this level
is updated based on the behavior of the node. When a source
node receives RREP, it waits to receive further route replies
from its neighboring nodes and then selects a neighbor node
with a highest fidelity level to forward data to the destination
node. A destination node acknowledges receiving the data
by sending ACK. Updating the fidelity level of node relies
on trusted participation of the node in the network. The
source node increments or decrements the fidelity level of
the forwarding node upon receiving or missing the ACK
respectively. Node is eliminated from the network if its fidelity
level reaches zero and marked as a malicious node. The main
drawback of this solution is the high end-to-end delay specially
when the malicious node is far away from the source node.
N. Mistry [8] introduced a solution that depends on
analysing all received RREP. As source node receives first
RREP, it waits MOS WAIT TIME seconds to receive mul-
tiple RREPs. During this time, the source node saves all
the received RREPs in a table. Thereafter, the source node
makes an analysis of all stored RREPs from the table, and
rejects any having very high destination sequence number and
considering its sender as malicious. The remaining entries in
the table are arranged according to their destination sequence
number and the node with the highest number is selected.
This technique also records the identity of suspected malicious
nodes to discard any upcoming control packets received and/or
forwarded from/to that node and a routing entry for that node
will not be maintained. The algorithm introduces high end-to-
end delay as nodes have to wait for multiple RREPs.
N. Choudhary [4] introduced a solution that based on sens-
ing the wireless channel. This approach assigns a max trust
value to all its neighboring nodes. A node will not do any
further communication with a neighbor whose trust value is
less than min trust value. When a source node receives a
RREP message, it updates its routing table, starts transmitting
the data packets and inserts a unique sequence number with
each transmitted data packet. When a node forwards a data
packet, it sets a timer and listens to the wireless channel in
promiscuous mode to ensure that this packet is forwarded by
a next hop neighbor. When the timer expires without hearing
the retransmission of this packet, the node reduces the trust
value for its next hop node. Trust value information is updated
and disseminated to other neighboring nodes. If the trust value
of a node decreases below min trust value, it will be isolated
by all the nodes in the network.
IV. BRM-AODV PROTOCOL
BRM-AODV is designed to mitigate the effect of the
blackhole attack on the performance of AODV protocol by fast
detection of blackhole neighbors. The mechanism introduces a
new concept of Self-Protocol Trustiness (SPT) which clarifies
that the detection of a malicious intruder is accomplished by
complying with the normal protocol behavior and lures the
malicious node to give an implicit avowal of its malicious
behavior. The mechanism does not use cryptographic tech-
niques which conserves the power and computation resources.
Furthermore, the mechanism neither adds new routing packets
nor modifies the existing ones. We introduce a small modi-
fication to the original AODV by storing the last three per
hop times for a RREP received for a destination. The per hop
time is calculated as the latency between sending a RREQ and
receiving its corresponding RREP divided by the hop count
value included in the RREP.
Each node in the network has to monitor the performance
of its neighbors to detect if any misbehave as blackholes.
BRM-AODV has no thresholds, such as RREP rate, that may
be disseminated to malicious nodes and introduce a way for
these malicious nodes to work under these thresholds. Instead
of this, a node periodically sends a fake RREQ from a non-
existant source node to a non-existant destination node. Only
a malicious node will respond to this fake RREQ. If a node
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Fig. 1. FSM of Node Trust Level
receives a RREP to its fake RREQ from one of its neighbors,
the node becomes sure that this neighbor is a blackhole node.
The algorithm introduces two different variables; trust level
and confidence level. Once a node joins a network, it sets
its trust level to normal and it updates this trust level to
either trust or threat upon reception of replies to its fake
RREQs. Figure 1 shows the operation of trust levels as a finite
state machine. A confidence level is a value assigned to each
neighbor by a node. It is initialized to MAX CONFIDENCE
and decremented whenever that neighbor replies to a fake
RREQ. Table 1 shows the values of parameters that were
used in our simulations. A node implementing the Blackhole
Resisting Mechanism behaves as follows:
• A node periodically sends a fake RREQ from a
random non-existing source node to a random non-
existing destination node. The node stores these fake
source and destination addresses in a trustiness table
for later examination. The node also sets an expiry
time for this entry to avoid the table inflation.
• A node initialises its trust level to normal and
sends fake RREQs at random time intervals between
MIN NORMAL and MAX NORMAL. If a node re-
ceives a reply to one of its fake RREQs, it changes
its trust level to threat and sends fake RREQs at
random time intervals between MIN THREAT and
MAX THREAT. The node upgrades it trust level from
threat to normal or from normal to trust if it sends
two successive fake RREQs without receiving a reply
during RREP VALIDATE period. A node that set its
trust level to trust sends fake RREQs at random time
intervals between MIN TRUST and MAX TRUST.
The MIN NORMAL and MAX NORMAL interval,
and their equivalents for thread and trust levels, are
chosen to give a greater rate of testing of a neighbor
when it is less trusted. These three intervals introduce
more difficulty for a malicious node looking to subvert
our proposed mechanism by tracing fake RREQs rate
and differentiating it among valid RREQs.
• To solve the trade-off between flooding the network
with fake RREQs which increases the routing over-
head and detection of validity of the RREQ by a
malicious node, it is suggested that the TTL value of
this fake RREQ is set to a random number between
TTL MIN and TTL MAX. We suggest values of 1
and 4 for these limits. This limit as well convinces any
malicious neighbor that the node which sent the RREQ
to it is a forwarding node and it did not originate it
for testing the malicious trustiness.
TABLE I. BRM-AODV PARAMETERS
MAX CONFIDENCE 7
RREP VALIDATE 5 s
TRAFFIC TIME 10 s
MIN THREAT 5 s
MAX THREAT 30 s
MIN NORMAL 30 s
MAX NORMAL 90 s
MIN TRUST 90 s
MAX TRUST 150 s
• If a RREP is received from a neighbor for this fake
RREQ and both fake source and destination addresses
are found in the trustiness table and either the source
address of this reply or the number of hops identifies
that RREP originator is the neighbor (i.e. number of
hops is 2), the node identifies the originator as a
blackhole node by setting its black list value to 1
and removes it from its routing table and drops any
upcoming RREPs received from this neighbor without
processing. This check forces a malicious node look-
ing to launch a blackhole attack to impersonate as
other node has originated this RREP and guarantees
that malicious neighbor will stop claiming it has best
route to a destination by setting its reply hop count to
2.
• If a RREP is received from a neighbor for this fake
RREQ and both fake source and destination addresses
are found in the trustiness table and the source address
of this reply is not identical to the forwarding neighbor
and the number of hops is greater than 2 which implies
that this neighbor may be a victim used to forward this
RREP or a malicious node that tries to subvert our
algorithm. The node drops this RREP and computes
the latency between sending the corresponding RREQ
and this RREP and then divided this value by the
hop count received in this RREP to calculate the
per hop time for the received RREP. Then, the node
compares this value to the average hop time of all
routes included in the routing table taking into account
that each route has three previously stored per hop
time values. If the per hop time of the received RREP
is less than the average per hop time of all stored
routes in the routing table, the node decrements this
neighbor confidence level for each received RREP of
a fake RREQ. The node clarifies that this neighbor
trying to use the blackhole feature of replying without
checking its RREP which is a reason of receiving the
RREP faster than those from other normal nodes.
• If a neighbor confidence level becomes zero, the
node identifies this neighbor as a blackhole node or
a colluding node. If this neighbor is not malicious,
it might be a colluding node as it should detect its
malicious neighbor that uses it as victim node to
forward RREPs. Decrementing a confidence level for a
neighbor ensures that the node gives plenty of time for
it neighbor to discover its malicious neighbor which
is implicating it in misbehaving. So, the node sets the
neighbor’s black list value to 1 and removes it from
its routing table and ignores any RREPs received from
this neighbor.
V. SIMULATION APPROACH
NS-2 simulator [9] is used to simulate AODV, SAODV
and our new BRM-AODV routing protocols under blackhole
attack. The parameters used are shown in Table 2. Node
mobility was modelled with the random waypoint method. In
all cases, the 90% confidence interval was small compared with
the values being reported. While we examined our proposed
mechanism on both UDP and TCP traffic and the mechanism
succeeded in detecting blackhole neighbors and enhancing the
network performance for both, this paper is focused on the
results of the proposed mechanism on the TCP traffic only.
We examined our proposed mechanism for different number
of nodes (25, 50, 75 and 100) and different node speeds (0,
5, 10, 15, 20 and 25 m/s). The highest negative impact of
malicious nodes usually appears on static networks and this
effect decreases as nodes mobility increases [1], so we report
here the case of static networks. Finally, we compare the
performance of networks using AODV under blackhole attacks
with and without our mechanism. We also compare the results
to SAODV as it is a well-known fully secured MANET reactive
protocol chosen by IETF for standardization.
Our blackhole attack model assumes that once a malicious
node receives a RREQ packet from any other node, it im-
mediately constructs a fake RREP that includes a randomly
generated hop count between 2 and 4 to spoof other nodes
about best route (i.e. 1 to 3 hop counts only from the RREQ
source). The attacker assigns the destination sequence number
value of this fake RREP as equal to the received one in the
RREQ plus randomly generated number between 10 and 30 to
spoof other nodes about the freshness of this RREP. Then, the
attacker unicasts this fake RREP toward the RREQ source.
TABLE II. SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Simulation Time 600 s
Simulation Area 1000 m x 1000 m
Number of Nodes 100
Number of Connections 150
Number of Malicious Nodes 0 - 10
Node Speed 0 - 25 m/s
Pause Time 10 s
Traffic Type TCP
Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR): The ratio of packets that are
successfully delivered to a destination compared to the number
of packets that have been sent out by the sender.
Throughput: The number of data bits delivered to the appli-
cation layer of destination node in unit time measured in bps.
End-to-End Delay (EED): The average time taken for a
packet to be transmitted across the network from source to
destination.
Routing Overhead: The number of routing packets for route
discovery and route maintenance required to deliver the data
packets from sources to destinations.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
The effect of blackhole attack on the packet delivery ratio
is shown in Figure 2. While the blackhole attack has severe
impact on the PDR of AODV specially for large number
of malicious nodes, BRM-AODV achieves an approximately
constant PDF regardless the number of malicious nodes. On
the other hand, while SAODV has a constant PDR regardless
the number of malicious nodes such as our algorithm; our
algorithm achieves a better PDR value than SAODV.
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Figure 3 shows the effect of blackhole attack on the
network throughput. Throughput of BRM-AODV is better than
AODV by approximately 25% for each malicious node and the
enhancement becomes huge for high malicious number. While
the throughput of AODV dramatically decreases as the number
of malicious nodes increases, BRM-AODV slightly decreases
for the high number of malicious nodes. The mechanism intro-
duces a negligible degradation of throughput in the absence of
malicious nodes. In addition, our algorithm achieves a better
throughput than SAODV by approximately 100%.
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The effect of blackhole attack on the end-end-delay is
shown in Figure 4. An expected logical result has to be
increasing the end-end-delay as the number of malicious nodes
increases and this delay should be at least equal the delay of the
network in the absence of malicious nodes. On the other hand,
the results show that the delay of the original AODV protocol
is reduced as the number of malicious nodes increases which
is slightly paradoxical as the attack improves the delay. This
is a misleading result because the delay is only measured on
packets that reach their destinations and since the blackhole
nodes drop all received data routed through them, the number
of packets that will be considered in calculating the delay
decreases as the number of malicious nodes increases. So, the
routes that avoid blackhole nodes suffer less competition, and
hence reduced delay. As our proposed mechanism succeeded
in receiving many data packets relative to AODV, the number
of packets that will be considered in calculating the delay
increases approaching the logical level that is the delay of
network in the absence of malicious nodes. While delay does
not affect too much in SAODV regardless the number of
malicious nodes, our algorithm decreases it slightly compared
to SAODV.
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Figure 5 shows the effect of blackhole attack on the
routing overhead. The result shows that the routing overhead
of AODV decreases as a result of malicious nodes increases
which is slightly confusing as the blackhole attack improves
the routing overhead. This is because the blackhole nodes
stop rebroadcasting the RREQ which decreases the number
of RREQ packets, one of the factors used to measure the
routing overhead. The routing overhead of BRM-AODV slowly
decreases as the number of malicious nodes increases and
approaches to the routing overhead value of network in the
absence of malicious nodes as a result of continuous detection
of blackhole nodes. On the other hand, while routing overhead
in SAODV is constant regardless the number of malicious
nodes, our algorithm reduces the routing overhead compared
to SAODV. Although the figure shows that the number of
routing packets of our algorithm is less than its value of
SAODV by approximately 5%, this enhancement increases up
to approximately 400% if we consider the difference between
AODV and SAODV packet sizes.
Our simulation shows that regardless of the number of
nodes and the number of malicious nodes in the network, a
node will detect a malicious neighbor within a short time.
Figure 6 shows the proportion of malicious nodes that have
been detected as time progresses. For clarity, we only show the
results for 1, 4, 7 and 10 malicious nodes. The figure shows
that as the simulation time increases the mechanism succeeded
in detecting and excluding malicious nodes up to more than
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75% of blackhole neighbors if the time is 600 seconds. The
mechanism succeeded in excluding high percentage of the
blackhole neighbors after 120 seconds from the beginning
of the simulation because most of the genuine RREQs and
RREPs are sent during this period. The mechanism continues
to exclude more blackhole neighbors after that with low rate
as a result of small number of RREQs and blackhole replies
to these requests.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The paper introduced a new concept of Self-Protocol
Trustiness (SPT) in which detecting a malicious intruder is
accomplished by complying with the normal protocol behavior
and luring the malicious node to give an implicit avowal of its
malicious behavior. We introduced a new Blackhole Resisting
Mechanism (BRM) that can be incorporated into any reactive
routing protocol in MANET. The proposed mechanism did
not use cryptographic techniques which conserves the power
and computation resources. Furthermore, the mechanism did
not require any additional packets and hence does not incur
any additional overhead. As an example, we incorporated
our Blackhole Resisting Mechanism into AODV to study the
performance of the network under the presence and absence of
the mechanism. Simulation results showed that BRM-AODV
gives a huge improvement of the network performance in all
network metrics over both AODV and SAODV. The proposed
mechanism succeeded in detecting blackhole nodes within
a short time regardless the number of malicious nodes and
the time they are participating in the network. Future work
includes extending this idea to other reactive protocols, and
confirming its general applicability.
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